A major concern for those designing safety-critical, highreliability, or dependable control systems is ensuring that they meet the same rigorous safety standards as the underlying complex systems which they control. As hardware components have become more reliable, and their properties better understood, it has become easier to make safety claims about these aspects of a system. Even for software components, which have benefited from structured and formal methods to specify their intended behaviour and rigorous verification and validation techniques to test this, safety claims are now possible. Usability issues, particularly operator errors, are an Achilles Heel for safety engineering. Systematic approaches to the inclusion of human factors concerns in rigorous safety engineering practice are long overdue. In this paper we draw on our recent experience of the design phase of a major communications system, and discuss why simply passing new isolated techniques into the safety arena is insufficient. We go on to demonstrate how insights from an established cognitive engineering technique (Programmable User Modelling) could be fully incorporated into existing safety engineering practice.
INTRODUCTION
Control systems must be designed to the same rigorous standards as the underlying system being controlled. These underlying systems are often specified to a particular integrity level, for example "dependable", "high reliability" or "safety critical", and the control system must meet that integrity level to ensure full system safety.
Such systems usually arise out of a well-defined design process that is rigorous, often formal, with many separate stages. Great effort is usually expended in requirements engineering to ensure that the correct system will be built. The system is then carefully constructed from hardware and software components, the hardware usually being built from components whose properties are well understood, and the software usually being developed following a rigorous process to meet a formal specification, with thorough testing to increase confidence in its correctness. At all stages the designers and engineers try to ensure that they are building "the right system" and "the system right" through a rolling programme of validation and verification.
Typically the role of users in assuring the correct performance of the system has been played down within such a design process, perhaps because of difficulties expressing or reasoning about what Hollnagel (1) terms "human erroneous actions" and their effect on system reliability.
Many techniques have been developed to address the user in the design of user interfaces. For example in Human Reliability Analysis techniques, probability figures exist [e.g. Swain & Guttman (2) ] which allow calculations of the probability of various human errors.
Such calculations have been combined with reliability statistics for the other components of the designed artefact to make assertions about the reliability of the wider system. However, such approaches have suffered heavy criticism, for example Hollnagel (3) . Criticism has even come from earlier advocates such as Swain (4) . These criticisms have included: inadequacy of available data; inconsistency between experts; overreliance on simulator data; absence of proof of accuracy; inclusion of unrealistic assumptions; and failure to consider performance shaping factors.
Almost independently of such work, Human Factors researchers and practitioners have developed many techniques for evaluating system designs. Rather than calculating how frequently errors may arise, this work seeks to deploy knowledge about human performance derived from psychology and cognitive science to identify aspects of a design which may be problematic for users and hence reduce their performance.
Such techniques typically share a fairly common approach: given a design of the proposed user interface (which may be a prototype or mock-up), practitioners analyse the system and pronounce whether it is "fit for purpose". The use of such techniques can help increase the consideration of human aspects of the wider system.
A wide variety of such techniques exist, each focusing on slightly different approaches to usability or on different methods of reasoning. They also vary in their degree of rigour and formality, the range of issues they consider and the skills needed to apply them. For example, the GOMS family of techniques [Card et al (5), John & Kieras (6)] can be used to reason rigorously about task structures for expert users, assessing the time that will be taken for each task analysed and allowing the analyst to compare alternative task structures; however, they do not readily support reasoning about possible human errors because they assume correct performance at all times. Conversely, Cognitive Walkthrough [Wharton et al (7) ] is a technique that is concerned with possible sources of human error that might arise because of poor information display, but is concerned with exploratory behaviour -in which the user is learning about the system through a process of exploration -and therefore is poorly suited to considering expert user performance.
The technique applied in the work reported here is Programmable User Modelling (PUM) [Young et al (8) , Blandford & Young (9, 10) ]. PUM is ideally suited to use in a formal development situation as it is a fairly rigorous approach to describing users and reasoning about aspects of their behaviour; specifically their acquisition of knowledge and their use of this to accomplish their tasks. It is based on the idea of "programming" a cognitive architecture with the knowledge it would need to be able to perform the user's tasks with a particular device. As it focuses on user knowledge, it excels at identifying sources of rational and reasonable user error, issues which are important in a safety-critical situation.
For safety assurance, however, analyses which occur when an interface has already been prototyped are often too late. To be able to specify meaningful safety requirements relating to the user, this activity must be undertaken from the outset, even informing the design of the earliest prototype interface. Later inputs are unlikely to be as influential upon the design, and late discovery of human factors problems can be extremely costly.
Until recently, PUM has only been used in an evaluative way. In this paper we describe a different approach. Working in collaboration with Praxis Critical Systems Limited we sought to systematically incorporate PUM into a formal design process for safety-critical systems, introducing user concerns before too many design commitments have been made. In particular, we have been working at the early safety engineering stages to investigate how user concerns can fit within the standard safety engineering procedures adopted by the company. The primary concern has been introducing user concerns without altering the basic procedure or adding new stages, which would both raise costs and add delays.
In the next section we give a brief overview of safety engineering. In later sections we describe PUM, how we approached incorporating PUM into the safety engineering process, and how this was tested during our involvement in the safety engineering of the design phase of a major communications system. Finally, we discuss our conclusions from this experience, the implications these have for making other techniques applicable in the design of high integrity systems, and how we intend to take this work further.
OVERVIEW OF SAFETY ENGINEERING
Praxis Critical Systems Limited (11) describe the aim of safety engineering as being to manage the introduction of a new or altered system into an environment, ensuring that this is "as free from risk as is reasonably practicable". The definitions used throughout this section are derived from this source.
Risk relates to the combination of the likelihood of an accident occurring and to the severity of the outcomes of such accidents, where an accident is defined as an unintended event which results in loss. Loss may include the more obvious events such as death or personal injury, and perhaps less obvious losses such as financial or environmental.
Safety engineering starts by considering the possible hazards of the new system, which are system states that can lead to an accident. This is typically conducted through a series of brainstorming meetings, using keyword prompts and checklists to aid discussion. Suitably qualified experts representing all areas that are relevant to the system being designed take part.
Safety engineers then conduct Causal Analysis. This involves identifying cause-effect sequences of hazardous events, which are the events which may combine to cause the hazards already identified. They next consider the sequences of events that could lead from a hazard to an accident, called Consequence Analysis.
Working through these phases of investigation, and iterating where appropriate, the safety engineers prepare a Safety Case, an argument that the system is safe. This is not a statement that the system is risk free -almost no system of any complexity can demonstrate this property.
Instead risks are typically divided into three categories, and each category is treated slightly differently.
1. Intolerable risks. These are risks which are not acceptable under any circumstances -for example, exposing a user of a system to a high likelihood of death each time a system is used. Safety engineers will explore with the designers ways of removing such risks or of drastically reducing their severity. The safety case needs to show that no such risks remain in the system 2. Negligible risks. These are risks which are so small as to be insignificant, and no further precautions are considered necessary. The safety case would only discuss those negligible risks which merited mention, for example ones previously considered significant risks.
Tolerable risks.
These are risks that are considered acceptable provided they confer some benefit and the risk can be shown to have been reduced as low as is reasonably practicable the balance between the cost of reducing the risk compared to the benefit this reduction would bring. The "benefit" may be hard to measure objectively, but some cost value has to be placed on such things as personal injury or death. The safety case would argue that the risk has been reduced ALARP, and that there was a benefit of allowing the risk at its given level.
Risk reduction measures involve specifying mitigation strategies intended to reduce the likelihood that a hazard will result in an accident or reducing the severity of the likely accident.
Because of the nature of safety engineering (the desire for confidence in the results, the need for outside scrutiny etc.), it is typically undertaken following a detailed, systematic safety management system, with independent safety audits and safety assessments, dovetailing with the other phases of an overall design process. One such system is Railtrack's Engineering Safety Management System (12), known as the "Yellow Book". Such systems exist in many industries and are broadly comparable, differing in matters of detail only.
Because of the number of domain and other experts needed, the wide range of factors under consideration and the need for accuracy, safety engineering tends to be both costly and time consuming. As it must often be conducted within a commercial environment, any techniques which are to be added into this work must be cost and time effective, fitting within existing practice, and must be easy to learn and use.
"TRADITIONAL" PUM
PUM was seen as being a suitable candidate technique for introducing human factors concerns to the design of high integrity systems because, as noted above, it involves producing a formal or rigorous analysis of user behaviour that matches with the kinds of software engineering techniques that are typically used in the design of such systems. PUM can be applied both for predicting likely rational interactive behaviours and for identifying sources of user error. Also, the PUM approach involves working with scenarios, which are often used in safety cases, for example during causal analysis.
PUM is an approach to analysing an interactive system that models the user as a problem solver of intentionally limited power (8) . The modelled problem solving is based on established theories of cognition [e.g. Newell (13) ].
The approach is based on the premise that the user has knowledge -about the current state of the system, about actions and their effects, and about the task. It also assumes that the user behaves rationally -that is, the user selects actions to perform (or plans an extended sequence of actions) on the basis of what is known and what the current tasks are. According to this approach, errors arise through the user having incomplete or incorrect knowledge. For example, users may need to keep track of components, or may be unable to predict the effects of actions adequately if information is inappropriately displayed.
A traditional PUM analysis follows a procedure that consists of up to five stages. In brief, these are as follows: the analyst starts by defining some task scenarios; the second stage is to identify conceptual operations to perform the candidate tasks; the third stage is to describe the knowledge the user needs to complete the task in a rigorous way; the fourth is to hand-simulate the interactive behaviour of user and system, working through how the user's knowledge and the system state change at every stage of the interaction; the final stage is to produce a running (implemented) model of the interactive behaviour. In practice, many analyses stop after stage three or four, as the analyst has generally gained an adequate understanding of the design and interaction issues by that point. The approach is described in more detail elsewhere [Blandford et al (14, 15) ].
The aim of this enterprise is to provide the designer or analyst with a means of identifying minimal requirements on the user's knowledge and capabilities, and considering in detail the consequences of there being gaps or inaccuracies in that knowledge.
One important focus of the analysis while writing the description is defining how users know things. Users may: come to the interaction knowing certain things that do not change; acquire information from the system (e.g. visual display or audible system output); track changes to the system state that are a direct (predictable) consequence of their actions; or may draw inferences about the system state from what is already known. However, users cannot know about aspects of system state without having some means of knowing them. The process of writing this description may highlight sources of potential difficulty without need for further analysis. 
THE APPROACH TO INTEGRATION
It is well recognised that learning to apply cognitively based techniques as outlined above is time-consuming. John & Packer (16) give an estimate of 35-50 hours practice to become proficient in Cognitive Walkthrough, while Blandford et al (14) found that novices could produce superficially adequate descriptions after 6 hours of training and practice, but had limited ability to reason about user behaviour or about possible design improvements at that stage.
Another obvious drawback of the "traditional" technique is that it is time-consuming to apply, and does not fit automatically into an existing process such as that presented in (13) .
Given the need for something which was capable of making serious contributions to design, at a much earlier stage and with low time and cost overheads, we sought to find a way to adapt the technique to this new application. Our approach was fairly simple: we sought to extract the "essences" of PUM analyses so that they could be fully incorporated into the existing process. In the following we consider the phases of Safety Engineering in turn and describe how PUM could fit into each.
Hazard Identification
The three knowledge questions described at the end of Section 3 above can easily be added to the keywords or checklists used already by safety engineers in their hazard identification brainstorming meetings to ensure issues relating to users' knowledge are fully considered.
Consequence Analysis
In considering escalation barriers, measures intended to prevent hazards resulting in accidents, the knowledge questions can be used to consider whether users will realise that a hazard exists and know the appropriate action to take, and hence whether an intended barrier will actually be effective.
Causal Analysis
The knowledge questions can be used to examine the knowledge needed by a user to accomplish a task correctly and to consider the effects of each piece of knowledge being missing or incorrect. This can then be used in the setting of the safety requirements.
Loss analysis.
In estimating the losses likely from the various possible accidents, the knowledge questions can help in the elicitation of information from domain experts by posing pertinent questions about possible accident scenarios.
Options analysis.
The knowledge questions can be posed to consider how proposed alternative solutions for risk reduction may remove identified knowledge problems and hence reduce the likelihood of certain hazards.
Impact analysis.
This would be outside the scope of PUM as it involves calculating the reduction in loss from adopting the proposed risk reduction strategies -the contribution towards this would have been in 4.5 above.
Demonstration of compliance and ALARP.
The knowledge questions can be used to consider whether risks relating to user knowledge could practicably be reduced further by amendments to the user interface/operating procedures etc. It can also be used to test how effective the existing human factors related risk reduction measures are.
In the next section we describe how we carried out this work in practice.
THE PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE
As part of our ongoing collaboration with Praxis Critical Systems Limited, we had the opportunity to be involved in the safety engineering which formed part of the initial design phase of a communications system. This work is commercially sensitive, and we are unable to disclose details of the system and the work conducted; instead we give a generalised description of the experience and describe how our inputs influenced each stage of the work.
One factor that we believe was crucial to the success of this work was that the PUM analyst involved (the first author) prepared fully for involvement with the project. Prior to commencement of the safety engineering work, he ensured that he was familiar with the safety procedures that were to be followed, with the application domain and with the existing documentation relating to this specific project so that he was fully aware of the current state of the design. In particular, he attended an Engineering Safety Management course, both to familiarise himself with the process and to gain some understanding of the underlying domain.
This commitment proved invaluable during the three months "live" work which followed, where the PUM analyst participated as a full member of the safety engineering team, contributing during the various stages of safety engineering. The engineers then delivered their work, including the Human Factors inputs. This work had to meet very tight deadlines, and there was no opportunity to complete analyses "off-line" in the way that human factors work is often undertaken.
In the following sections we describe how we were actually able to contribute to the first three stages of the safety engineering work.
Hazard Identification The initial Hazard
Identification brainstorming meetings included consideration of general human factors issues. The PUM analyst was able to assist in the analysis of these meetings, seeking to find plausible matches between problem issues raised and subsequently identified hazards.
Consequence Analysis
Whilst considering individual hazards, the PUM analyst was able to raise several pertinent issues, including the way in which normal speech protocols aid identification of the parties involved in a communication, and the problem of verifying the correct composition of automatically generated groups of users. These led directly to safety requirements regarding the content of messages which may be sent using the various methods to be supported by the system, requiring routine acknowledgement of messages, and requiring users to report back "unexpected" or "missing" communications.
Causal Analysis
As the design was at such an early phase, the safety engineers were unable to derive probabilities for event occurrences, using instead a discrete scale of likelihood estimates, ranging from "improbable" to "frequent", to assess their frequency. The PUM analyst was able to use this scale to assess the frequencies of knowledge problems arising.
Thus this activity enabled the safety engineers to identify specific safety requirements for the proposed system relating to user knowledge issues.
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
In this work we had unrestricted access to a safety engineering team, working to real deadlines in a commercial setting. This was no laboratory-based, idealised experiment. We were able to work in real-time, delivering "on-the-fly" analyses of issues as they arose, and suggesting issues and problems that might not otherwise have been addressed.
Obviously, in this style of 'action research', it is not possible to provide an experimental control such that the effect of human factors input can be clearly identified. One test of our contribution is the view of the safety engineering team; the main safety engineer has expressed a firm belief that the safety requirements for this system were "more extensive" than they would have been without our input.
In addition, the same engineer expressed the view thathaving participated in the process with the PUM analysthe would be able to use the knowledge questions developed for this work to take account of human "knowledge" factors in future safety engineering work. While this belief has yet to be tested, it is encouraging. Buckingham Shum & Hammond (17) discuss some of the difficulties of transferring ideas and experience between researchers and practitioners. The approach taken here, in which the PUM analyst prepared himself to participate as a full member of the design team, did all the human factors work in the team context and fitted in with existing practice, enabled other team members to observe and relate to the human factors work, in the style of 'cognitive apprenticeship' [Collins & Brown, (18) ].
We can identify several factors behind the success of this work which need to be taken into account in other work that seeks to strengthen the human factors element of design practice.
Firstly, all parties involved were strongly committed to making this a success. The safety engineers were highly receptive to the ways in which human factors experience could inform their work, and consequently encouraged total involvement. Also, the first author undertook introductory training that enabled him to fit in as a (more or less) equal partner in the team.
Secondly, the system being considered was highly interactive, and "scenarios of use" could be generated to a PUM style of analysis. Thus, the underlying human factors technique used has a theoretical basis that fits well with the approach taken in safety engineering.
Finally, the work was conducted to externally imposed deadlines, which ensured effort was focused on the outcome, rather than on undertaking analysis for its own sake. As such, it was possible to distill the most important aspects of the PUM approach, without exposing the rest of the safety team to unnecessary or distracting side-issues.
